40. Book Review: "That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation" by David Bentley Hart

That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation

By David Bentley Hart

Published by Yale University Press, 2019, pp. 232. 
Greek translation published by Akritas, 2023, pp. 282.

Book Reviewed (from the Greek text) by:
Fr. Nikolaos Loudovikos
(Published in "Synaxis", Issue 171, March 2025)

Source: Translated by John Sanidopoulos

Before I delve into the more profound theological aspects, I will begin by recounting a revelatory conversation, still vivid in my memory, with the venerable Elder Paisios during our very first meeting, decades ago. "The Fathers have concealed the love of God from us," he said to me. My ecclesiastical experience was merely a few months old, yet I had managed to read a couple of books. "But that is what they talk about," I stammered. "As soon as one encounters it, one feels the need to hide it; it is incomprehensibly vast, unbelievably compassionate, and indescribably humble and noble," he replied. "And why should it be hidden?" "Because its revelation would make people completely listless and indifferent," he replied. However, my own inquiry multiplied: could human indifference, listlessness, or audacity negate the goals of such a love? Therefore, did human, warm, or even merely elementary response matter, despite the absolute selflessness of God and the strength of His metaphysical imposition? This demolished a valuable remnant of my Platonizing, all-embracing, with the annihilating meaning that Levinas attributed to the term "metaphysics".

Reading Hart's work reminded me of the above experience. It reminded me mainly of my first encounter with his work, which was recorded in Greek in my book "Theopoiia: The Postmodern Theological Dilemma" (Armos ed., 2007, pp. 52-59). Dazzled by the Platonizing metaphysics of Gregory of Nyssa, which he connects with the Thomistic analogia entis, Hart, as I explain in the above book, understands creation as a reflection only of the divine glory and essence whose only Being consists precisely in the mirroring of the only truly Being, the essence of God, while the will and energy of rational beings are simply surrendered and extinguished within the corresponding divine beings. I had pointed out then that in this case the other maximum meaning of "analogy" is missing, which I personally consider as complementary to the first: I mean the synergistic/dialogical analogy of Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor (and Gregory Palamas), the dialogical reciprocity between Creator and created, as I called it. 

The loss of this second dimension of analogy is not negligible – in reality it represents the only negation of all holopoetic metaphysics, its Christianization, that is, where creation becomes, beyond any monophysitizing and monoenergizing transcendental remnants, truly present and active within the Christology of salvation. Without this second dimension, life and salvation in Christ risks being metaphysically correct, but existentially wrong in our formulations. Is it for this reason that I have in the past argued that Nyssa's expansion must be understood within the framework of the Maximian theology of the logoi of beings, precisely because the latter explains the former as a real dialogue of wills, intentions, and energies, where even the final sabbatism within the bosom of the divinity does not abolish the self-sufficiency and fullness of creation - is this not also the existential meaning of the Ascension of human nature to the right hand of the Father? Let us keep, I beg you, the above. 

The great and recurring lament of Hart in this book is about how it is possible for a half-blind human freedom, leaning on a partial, passionate, and tormented half-knowledge, and all the fears and darkness of worldly life, to be punished with "billions and trillions" of years of hellish torments – such punishment can only be pedagogical and temporary, according to him (p. 70). The American theologian dedicates several pages (pp. 145-153) to proving that the word "eternal" in the common Greek of the New Testament does not mean endless duration of time, but rather a specific period of time, and thus, Christ's words about "eternal torment" signify nothing more than a kind of temporary Purgatory. However, Hart seems to forget that in the very same passage, Christ also speaks of "eternal life"; could this too be temporary?

The author certainly discredits all possible malicious labels against the "infernalists," as he calls them, starting from the "sadism" of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Peter Lombard, and concluding with Calvin and Reformed Protestantism. Up to this point, all is well – however, one cannot help but note, with great surprise, how the author, throughout the entirety of his book, remains absolutely faithful to the juridical, that is to say, either punitive or rewarding conception of Heaven and Hell, and exhausts himself in shouting and threatening against the latter, as if the mistaken conception surrounding the former does not exactly give rise to the fixations concerning the latter.

Let me explain: I do not mean that Hart is a legalist, quite the contrary. Simply put, as an initiate of a holistic (to avoid saying pantheistic) Christianity, which he presents in regard to Gregory of Nyssa, justly or unjustly, he overlooks, in the face of the overwhelming metaphysical necessity of the assimilation of all into God (God must become "all things to all," as he emphasizes again and again – for example, p. 221), the true, dialogical communion of natures and wills in the end. The author is indeed conclusively convinced that "not only is the reality of a distinct decisive will not a necessary dimension of our nature, but so is the very capacity for such a will" (p. 215).

To refute this (outrageous) claim, the author presents a bad interpretation of Christology, showing the (constantly abused) Maximus claiming that the fact that Christ does not have a will of his own means that "his will is completely free" (p. 216). And the reason for the non-existence of a deductive will in Christ is simply that the Hypostasis of His two natures is one, that of God the Word (and besides, in the Holy Trinity there are no deductive wills, but one natural will, expressed in three natures, from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit); however, this cannot be automatically transferred to man, because the latter exists only hypostatically, that is, as a person, and therefore the non-existence of a deductive will here would only mean the abolition of precisely his freedom – in contrast to Hart. That here we see a tragic misunderstanding of Maximus's concept of the renunciation of free-will, which identifies it with its abolition, is something that I have long developed elsewhere (See N. Loudovikos, "Analogical Identities: The Creation of the Christian Self, vol. 2: Intremeaning fullness: Self-catholicization. Meta-narcissism, and Christian Theology," Brepols, 2024, pp. 124-130).

The consequence of the above is that Hart does not seem to suspect that "Heaven" and "Hell" are not at all places of punishment or reward (as in Islam), but primarily modes of existence, synergy, and dialogue with God. Reiterating the theory of restoration of Nyssa (p. 189 ff.), he first considers that it is impossible for a rational being to truly know God and nevertheless reject Him, and second, that the final apokatastasis of all in Christ would be completely unsuccessful if there exists a pocket of opposing and punished beings. Therefore, he does not hesitate (with a kind of indirect theodicy?) to "suggest" how God could arrange and engineer the affairs of each individual's life, so that ultimately everyone could "choose" Him (pp. 210-11) - without seeing that such a thing would indeed diminish God.

The lack of understanding precisely of dialogical reciprocity or, even better, according to my book mentioned in note 2, of analogical participation and, perhaps even better, according to the same book, of inter-understanding, makes it difficult for us to understand that the realities of “Heaven” and “Hell” are created by ourselves and not by Christ, Who is, contrary to Hart, truly “all things to all,” since He loves and offers Himself equally to everyone and everything. The aforementioned terms are related and explain each other successively, but unfortunately, this cannot be analyzed in this necessarily brief text. What may perhaps be conveyed here is that, in the first place, they justify the position of Maximus that Nyssa, with his theology, is "misusing" the theory concerning the restoration of all things. The position of the Confessor is that the restoration pertains only to the incorruptibility of natures, but does not necessitate a forced turning, by God, of the inclinations of rational beings towards Him. Consequently, all will have the vision and awareness of God, but some will also participate in His uncreated life, according to their voluntary/synergistic "uplifting" (the term is from the Areopagite) towards Him (Paradise!), while others will endure their autistic narcissism as self-hell.

Recently, when called to speak to the monks of a Mount Athos monastery, I received the exact question, "Does hell come to an end, and when?" I answered that yes, it possibly does come to an end. "When?" Well, when the Devil (and the consenting narcissists) chooses. When he synergizes, creating a common understanding with Christ, in a manner that signifies the existence of all beings in a proportional, consubstantial unity among them - "as we are one."

Christ cannot abolish the hell that I create, desire, and will. Even if my knowledge is partial and my desire conflicted, from the moment I contemplate them, despite that, fully and certainly, hell is there, already from this life. The Church, however, beseeches that the fragments of an alternative inclination, which in moments of solitude, temptation, and pain, are stirred up within me, may become secret links from where the indescribable love of God will lift me to His presence, in this life or the next... Yes, hell can be abolished.